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Kevin Muller
of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act. The act applied
definitions of taxable income and tax rates to the
corporation without regard to the status of its
owners.
The corporate excise tax was able to come to
fruition in advance of the Sixteenth Amendment
because it was considered to be an excise, indirect
tax and thus not prohibited by Article 1, §9 of the
Constitution. In the early part of the twentieth
century, most corporations distributed virtually all
of their profits as dividends, and so the corporate
tax at its inception primarily took the form of
withholdings on dividends. In addition to being a
source of revenue when individual taxes were
disallowed, the act of taxing corporations instead of
individuals had administrative benefits: “Because
of its regular and open distribution of dividends, the
corporation was an obvious target for an expansion
of stoppage-at-the-source collection efforts that had
proven so successful during the Civil War and
Reconstruction. In effect, the corporate tax was
thought to be a necessary mechanism for enforcing
a comprehensive scheme of individual income
taxation” (Bank, 452). The principal method of
enforcing personal income tax compliance during
the era had been to require taxpayers to sign an oath
swearing to the accuracy of the return (Bank, 519);
tax assessors were usually elected by the local
taxpayers and did not always act in the interest of
the government, so evasion was rampant. Because
corporate dividends were often distributed
regularly, formally and publicly according to state
corporation laws, withholding taxes on their
distribution provided a convenient method of
collecting revenue in such a way that the unpopular
and controversial inquisition into the private
matters of individuals was not necessary.
Today, the relative administrative advantages
of collecting taxes from corporations are less
compelling than they were a century ago.
Information technology advances have made
employee withholdings automated. Moreover,
corporate shares are increasingly owned by pension
funds, mutual funds and other corporations and so
the tracking of dividend payments is not as
straightforward as it was in the days of paper stock
certificates. Reporting requirements already
provide the IRS with data concerning wages,
withholdings, annuity and pension payments,

Introduction
The Corporate Income Tax
Since the adoption of the United States
Constitution endowing Congress with the power to
“…lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises, pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States”
in 1789 (art. I, §8, cl. 1), spirited and evolutionary
debate has focused on the manners in which the
government should collect revenues and monitor
citizens’ compliance with those manners. Though
the underlying purpose of the U.S. taxation system
is of course to collect revenue for use in
government-directed programs, the specific sources
of wealth that have been subject to – or not subject
to – taxation have been chosen in part to encourage
social, economic and political initiatives of national
and state governments with due consideration
toward the fairness of the system itself and the
economic burden that different taxes place on
various classes of citizens. Today, taxpayers are
subject to a complex, nuanced and unwieldy tax
code: According to a report released on Aug. 27,
2010 by the President’s Economic Recovery
Advisory Board, American taxpayers spend 7.6
billion hours and roughly $140 billion a year to
comply with federal tax regulations (Montgomery).
Until the passage of the Revenue Act of 1861,
government revenues were collected exclusively
through tariffs, sales and property taxes (U.S.
Treasury 2010). In 1862, the government first
levied a tax on personal income using a system
conceptually not far removed from the one used
today. Employers withheld taxes, deductions were
permitted and higher incomes were taxed at a
greater rate than lower incomes. The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled such a system unconstitutional in 1895
(Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.) on the
basis that certain of these taxes could be classified
as “direct,” thereby violating Article I of the U.S.
Constitution: “Representatives and direct Taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers…” (art. I,
§2, cl. 3).
The taxation of corporations began in 1909
with the passage of the corporate excise tax as part
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Social Security benefits and a variety of other
transactions affecting income and potential
deductions. Door-to-door surveys have been
replaced with dual-reporting systems and electronic
filing software that improve drastically the ability
of the IRS to verify information reported on
individual tax returns without personal inquisition.
Though discourse commonly treats the
corporation – and governments, for that matter – in
the abstract as an entity separable from the sum of
its parts, corporations are better characterized as a
vehicle through which individuals can organize in
order to operate more conveniently and efficiently
than they would as a collection of legally distinct
parties. In 1894, Sen. Anthony Higgins (R-Del.)
defined corporations as “but aggregations of the
capital of individuals for joint profit, with joint
liability and joint loss, conveniently divided into
shares for the purposes of distribution and
management” (Higgins). Though partnerships also
represent a form of organization for business
purposes, partnerships are a pass-through entity for
taxation purposes; income, credits and deductions
are allocated to the individuals that share ownership
and are taxed according to the status of those
individuals. Sole proprietorships are taxed at the
individual level as well, but current tax reporting
requirements make it difficult to statistically
determine the breakdown of revenues between sole
proprietorships and individuals.
In 1913, Congress passed the Sixteenth
Amendment, which gave the government the
authority to collect income taxes without regard to
the census of individual states. Until 1936,
dividends were excluded from personal income and
so corporate income was taxed only once; in 1936
that exclusion was removed. So began the
“considerable tension between the corporate
income tax and the individual income tax, because
corporations are owned, directly or indirectly, by
individuals who (ultimately) receive a share of the
corporations’ incomes” (IRS Data Release, 284).
Much of this tension has centered on the so-called
“double taxation” of corporate income: Revenues
are taxed once as income to the corporation - at
applicable corporate tax rates, which may,
depending on the taxpayer, be substantially greater
than corresponding individual rates and
dividend/capital gains rates – and again when
received by individual owners as dividends or
capital gains.
Upon passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act
in 1909, President William Taft defended a
corporate tax because it served as “an excise tax

upon the privilege of doing business as an artificial
entity and of freedom from a general partnership
liability enjoyed by those who own the stock”
(Taft). An official report at the time countered that
corporations represented “normal and necessary
forms for doing business … that hence in creating
corporations a State should be considered as
performing a duty rather than granting a privilege.
[T]he property and the business of corporations …
should be taxed with no exceptional machinery”
(Report).
Today, corporate taxes represent an important,
but relatively minor source of federal funds; in
2008, they provided 12 percent of total federal
revenues (Tax Policy Center). Imposing a corporate
tax allows the government to grant preferential
treatment to certain organizations by classifying
them as non-profit or creating tax incentives that
affect targeted industries or types of companies. A
more frequently cited argument for continuing to
tax corporations, though, is that absent corporate
taxes, the corporate form of organization itself
might be used as a tax shelter for individuals. That
is, individuals could shift part or all of their wealth
into corporations and thereby enjoy a lower tax
liability than wage employees. “As long as
dividends were taxed as ordinary income and the
accumulated earnings tax was strict enough, it was
difficult to use the corporate form to shelter a great
deal of income [prior to the corporate relief
package of 2003 that taxes dividends at a marginal
rate of 15% instead of at the taxpayer’s ordinary
rate],” wrote senior specialists in economic policy
and public finance in a 2007 report to Congress
(Gravelle, Hungerford 2007).
The argument that taxing corporations serves
as a backstop for wealthy investors is based on the
presumption that the corporate tax is paid wholly
by shareholders, but some economists argue that
this is not the case. In the phrasing of the
Congressional Budget Office, “A corporation may
write its check to the Internal Revenue Service for
payment of the corporate income tax, but that
money must come from somewhere: from reduced
returns to investors in the company, lower wages to
its workers, or higher prices that consumers pay for
the products the company produces” (CBO 1996,
2). Historian Bruce Bartlett observed, “The
[corporate] tax remains a major source of revenue
for governments at all levels and periodically draws
the ire of tax reformers, who feel that corporations
are not paying their ‘fair share’ of taxes – based on
a naïve and incorrect assumption that, if
corporations paid more, other Americans would
99
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pay less” (Bartlett 1985, 1). Bartlett argues that the
double taxation of corporate income also has a
significant effect on the cost of equity financing
because taxes on dividends reduce increase the cost
of investing; this distortion may contribute to the
decision to raise capital through debt instead of
equity financing and incur interest expense.
Joel Slemrod, a professor of economics at the
University of Michigan, argues that the double
taxation of corporate income is inefficient from a
policy perspective (Slemrod 2004). He states that
dividend payouts are easier to monitor and tax than
corporate income and that corporations might be
less likely to aggressively pursue tax shelters if tax
savings accrue directly to shareholders and not to
the corporation itself (21).
Determining the true incidence of the
corporate income tax is further complicated when
one considers the responses of each group to the
effects of the tax and the residual effects of those
responses. Existing literature regarding who bears
the incidence of corporate taxes is varied and does
not point decisively to one conclusion over another
(CBO 1996, 30). As recently as December 2010,
the CBO has written that “households bear the
burden of corporate income taxes, but the extent to
which they bear that burden as owners of capital,
workers, or consumers is not clear” (CBO 2010, 2).

range of items that qualify as expenses for GAAP
reporting, so certain permanent differences between
“book” and tax income exist that need never be
reconciled. The manner through which companies
have been required to communicate information
about their obligation to pay taxes has evolved over
the past century; currently, companies record a
“current” liability or asset that corresponds to the
cash amount of taxes to be paid or refunded, and a
“deferred” liability or asset representing future
taxable income or future deductions from income
that have been recorded in the company’s GAAP
financial statements but will not be considered a
taxable event until a future period (ASC 740-10-252).
For example, corporations are permitted to use
accelerated cost recovery methods for tax purposes
that allocate depreciation deductions/expense
differently than methods typically followed under
GAAP. While the sum total of depreciation for a
given asset will ultimately be the same under both
methods when all years are considered, the
depreciation for any individual year will likely be
different under each system. Other areas where
temporary differences frequently occur include the
provision for bad debts, pension contributions,
unearned revenue and the carry-forward or carryback effects of tax losses. Substantial book-tax
differences can arise for companies with
subsidiaries, since the IRS uses different
consolidation rules than GAAP. Temporary and
permanent differences are currently outlined to the
IRS using Schedule M-3.
Publicly-traded corporations have an
obligation to shareholders to maximize income and
create wealth. Reducing tax expense has an
immediate effect on bottom-line profitability and
corporations therefore have an interest in
minimizing tax expense. In the short term, it is
possible for corporations to keep taxable income
low while keeping reported net income high
through the careful use of accounting techniques
that defer taxable income and take advantage of
preferential tax treatments. Research suggests,
though, that firms cannot permanently sustain large
book-tax differences without being aggressive and
potentially risking IRS adjustments upon audit
(Mills 1998, 355).
Many corporations are proactive in making
business decisions that avoid the realization of
taxable income. These corporations create tax
savings by shifting income into low-tax
jurisdictions and take advantage of existing
deductions, tax credits and organizational structures

Accounting for Income Taxes
Though the very first corporate taxes were
exacted based on income as defined by accounting
standards, it quickly became clear that the goals of
accounting systems were divergent from those of
taxation systems and so tax laws were developed
that included “specific definitions of many items of
income and deductions, and many pages specifying
when and how to account for the items…” (IRS
Data Release, 285).
Though taxes are not calculated using
financial reporting standards, corporations have to
record the cash flow and economic effects of
income taxes using the framework of generally
accepted accounting principles. Because GAAP
uses an accrual basis of accounting where revenues
and expenses are recognized when they are
incurred and not when cash is received or remitted
(SFAC No. 1, 3), a corporation’s recorded income
tax expense can frequently be markedly different
from the sum of income tax liabilities reported to
various regulatory agencies for a given period.
Additionally, the range of items that qualify as
deductions for income tax purposes differ from the
100
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that entail a preferential tax status. The term “tax
planning” can refer to the collective effort of
management to consciously minimize tax expense
through elective decisions. Though firms of all
kinds – as well as individuals – can engage in tax
planning at some level, a 2009 study using data
from 1998 finds that the companies which manage
and measure their tax departments as profit centers
versus firms that view their tax department
primarily as a cost center tend to be larger and often
yield lower effective tax rates and higher
coordination between departments (Robinson et. al.
2009, 24-25). A corporation’s effective tax rate is
most often calculated by dividing accrued income
tax expense by pretax income from continuing
operations.
Most firms are interested primarily in reducing
accrual, not cash, tax expense (Robinson et. al.
2009, 30). A possible reason for this behavior is
that executives tend to be compensated based on
after-tax GAAP earnings. Additionally, because the
cash payment for taxes for any given tax year is not
publicly available, accrual tax expense tends to be
the most convenient measurement of a firm’s tax
performance for investors. Though cash outflows
related to taxes are separately identified in the
statement of cash flows, this number may represent
years of back taxes or prepayments in addition to
the current year tax bill.
Appendix B illustrates selected tax
information of General Electric Company for 20082010. GE’s reported 2010 current tax expense of $4
million on pretax earnings of $14,208 million drew
much attention in popular media, but the situation
is not as simple as it might seem. First off, the
accrual-based tax provision reported in the
company’s income statement for 2010 was $1,050
million – still a fairly paltry effective tax rate of
7.39%, but a far cry from just $4 million. An
examination of the notes to GE’s financial
statements reveals that though the company is
subject to the top U.S. marginal corporate tax rate
of 35.0%, the tax effects of global operations
reduced this rate by 25.8%. Roughly 64.3% of
GE’s 2010 net earnings were derived from
international operations, and a substantial portion
of these earnings were reinvested indefinitely and
therefore subject to tax rates of less than 35%. U.S.
tax law currently defers the imposition of U.S. tax
on certain active financial services income until
that income is repatriated to the U.S. as a dividend.
Required financial statement notes related to
income taxes are not so detailed as to allow a
recreation of a company’s specific transactions that

yield current and deferred tax expenses and
benefits, but GE’s statements demonstrate that
accrual techniques and international tax laws can
have a dramatic impact on a company’s current tax
expense and therefore a more comprehensive
understanding of tax expense is required to evaluate
the extent to which a company effectively manages
its tax expense.
In order to realize actual net tax savings, firms
must consider both the tax and economic effects of
a decision. For example, a firm might enjoy a lower
marginal income tax rate by operating out of a
certain jurisdiction, but the cost of constructing a
plant and transferring resources to that jurisdiction
might well outweigh any pure tax savings. In its
Guiding Principles of Good Tax Policy (Appendix
A), the Tax Division of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants writes, “The effect of
the tax law on a taxpayer’s decisions as to how to
carry out a particular transaction or whether to
engage in a transaction should be kept to a
minimum … That is, taxpayers should not be
unduly encouraged or discouraged from engaging
in certain activities or taking certain courses of
action primarily due to the effect of the tax law on
the activity or action.” The AICPA acknowledges,
though, challenges that “stem from the desire to use
the tax law for more than raising revenue, for
instance, to implement social or economic policies”
and notes that tradeoffs must be made among all
the considerations of a fair tax system in order to
create an optimal model (AICPA, 13).
Tax Avoidance versus Tax Evasion
To fully appreciate the complexities that make
requirements like Financial Accounting Standards
Board Interpretation No. 48 and the Schedule of
Uncertain Tax Positions unpopular among some
taxpayers, one must consider the difference
between tax avoidance and tax evasion, as well as
the difficulty of distinguishing between the two.
Tax avoidance refers to strategically making
business decisions that are fully legal but take
advantage of preferential tax jurisdictions and
treatments. For example, an individual might avoid
incurring taxes on income by investing in tax-free
municipal bonds, instructing an employer to deposit
wages into a tax-free individual retirement account
or choosing to realize capital gains only when he
can realize losses to offset the taxable gains. Tax
evasion, on the other hand, generally refers to
illegally and knowingly underpaying taxes either by
intentionally reporting taxable income incorrectly
101
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or incompletely or by engaging in transactions that
create tax losses but bear little or no economic risk.
In the former case, issues of legality are usually
cut-and-dry; taking a job that pays wages “under
the table” and not reporting that income is clearly
tax evasion. Classifying transactions that might be
considered tax evasion on the basis that they reduce
tax liability outside the spirit of the law, however,
can involve a substantial level of judgment,
especially when those transactions are made at the
corporate level and involve complicated legal and
financial steps.
In some cases, corporations and in particular
large, international firms with tax haven
subsidiaries (Lisowsky 2010, 1711) are able to take
advantage of tax avoidance transactions, defined by
the U.S. Treasury as “any transaction in which the
reasonably expected pre-tax profit … of the
transaction are insignificant relative to the
reasonably expected net tax benefits … of such
transaction” (Treasury 1999, 157). The IRS
characterizes these abusive shelters as “very
complicated transactions that sophisticated tax
professionals promote to corporations and wealthy
individuals, exploiting tax loopholes and reaping
large and unintended tax benefits” (GAO
Testimony 2003). Nevertheless, “Under present
law, there is no uniform standard as to what
constitutes a tax shelter; however, there are
statutory provisions, judicial doctrines, and
administrative guidance that attempt to limit or
identify transactions in which a significant purpose
is the avoidance of evasion of income tax” (Joint
Committee on Taxation 2002, 4).
Since many abusive shelters are based on legal
tax planning techniques, it is often difficult for
courts to distinguish legitimate tax planning efforts
from illicit shelters (Levinsohn 2005). The
Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that all
taxpayers retain the right to reduce their tax liability
or avoid paying taxes altogether provided they do
so within the boundaries of the law. Frequently,
though, courts defer to the economic substance
doctrine frequently credited to the 1934 Gregory v.
Helvering. In this and many cases since, courts
have found that tax savings based on literal and
straightforward application of tax law are not
permissible if the taxpayer realizes no economic
benefits from entering into a transaction aside from
the tax savings themselves. The IRS has more
recently clarified that transactions may be legal
even if they do not actually yield a profit as long as
a cash flow or net present value analysis proves that
the taxpayer could have reasonably realized a profit

(IRS Notice 2002-50, 6-B-III). The IRS also
advocates employing the substance over form test,
that is, a set of transactions yielding the same end
result should be treated in the same way for tax
purposes regardless of the legal steps used to
achieve that end (IRS 2002-50, 6-C). Nevertheless,
federal courts have sometimes ruled that
transactions are allowable even if executed
exclusively for the purpose of realizing tax savings.
Often, tax avoidance transactions are created
and sold to corporations and individuals as “tax
shelters.” The U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations found that between
1997 and 2001, KPMG sold four “active tax
products” to more than 350 individuals which
generated revenues for the firm in excess of $124
million; three of those products were later
determined by the IRS to be potentially abusive or
illegal tax shelters (U.S. Senate 2003, 27). In that
2003 report, the Committee concluded that “the tax
shelter industry as a whole remains active,
developing new products, marketing dubious tax
shelters to numerous individuals and corporations,
and continuing to wrongfully deny the U.S.
Treasury billions of dollars in revenues, leaving
average U.S. taxpayers to make up the difference”
(3). In a tax shelter case involving global
accounting firm KPMG, internal emails sent by tax
professionals demonstrated calculations showing
that the penalties for not registering tax products
with the IRS, thus violating federal tax shelter laws,
would be low compared to the fees generated by
selling the products to clients, and that registering
the tax shelters with the IRS would place the firm at
a competitive disadvantage (13).
Though methodological and data constraints
make it difficult to estimate with certainty the
dollar amount of potential tax revenues lost through
the use of tax shelters, an IRS contractor estimated
that the average between 1993 and 1999 was
between $11.6 billion and $15.1 billion per year
(GAO Testimony 2003, 6). The U.S. Treasury has
expressed concern about the proliferation of
corporate tax shelters not only because of the shortterm reduction in the corporate tax base but also
because “corporate tax shelters breed disrespect for
the tax system – both by the people who participate
in the tax shelter market and by others who
perceive unfairness” (U.S. Treasury 1999, iv).
Additionally, the costs incurred by users and
promoters of tax shelters to create and defend tax
benefits are economically unproductive. For all of
these reasons, the government has in the past
102
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decade especially taken a serious interest in
reducing the prevalence of tax shelters.
Investors, too, can easily justify an interest in
understanding how aggressive a particular company
is in avoiding taxes and utilizing tax shelters.
Public exposure of a company’s use of tax shelters
is almost certainly a negative event – often,
penalties and legal defense expenses are incurred,
and there exists a public characterization of firms
that evade taxes as poor corporate citizens. Some
investors may also view aggressive tax behavior as
an indicator of poor corporate governance and
wonder if the firm is cheating not only the IRS but
investors as well (Hanlon, Slemrod 2006, 12). On
average, news of a corporation being involved in a
tax shelter negatively affects that firm’s stock price,
especially for retail firms (Hanlon, Slemrod 2006,
5). Hanlon and Slemrod note, though, the difficulty
of gauging the actual or perceived earnings effect
of a tax shelter savings reversal since it is nearly
impossible to reliably determine when a firm
booked the savings initially and what amount of
savings have been surrendered after exposure of the
tax shelter since any valuation reserves would have
been recorded in aggregate (28). Hanlon and
Slemrod did not find a significant correlation
between stock prices and the release of reports from
Citizens for Tax Justice identifying firms that pay
little or no taxes (35).

decision to accrue or disclose, and firms developed
divergent policies for dealing with SFAS No. 5
based on a variety of factors. Research indicates
that many firms under-disclosed material claims
and did not provide the detailed information
required by SFAS No. 5 (Gleason and Mills 338).
In June 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, a nongovernmental body that develops
accounting techniques for U.S. companies, issued
an interpretation of SFAS No. 109, which had
established the asset-liability approach to recording
temporary and permanent book-tax differences.
FASB Interpretation No. 48, now a part of
Accounting Standards Codification 740-10,
“prescribes a recognition threshold and
measurement attribute for the financial statement
recognition and measurement of a tax position
taken or expected to be taken in a tax return” (FIN
48, Summary).
While FIN 48 established a needed
consistency for treating contingencies related to
UTPs, it contains provisions that depart from the
foundational goal of financial reporting – providing
relevant, reliable information to third-party users of
investors and creditors – in favor of an idealistic
model that assumes companies will remit all
possible taxes to all possible collecting agencies
even when the practical likelihood of such an
occurrence is remote. FIN 48 caters to another
third-party user that stands to benefit from the
profitability of corporations: the government, and
by extension, all who benefit from the expenditures
of government. In effect, FIN 48 asks corporations
to audit themselves for tax compliance and then
publicize a hypothetical income tax liability that is
likely different from the one the company has
proposed to the Internal Revenue Service under the
voluntary reporting system addressed in Flora v.
United States; in that case, the Supreme Court
noted that “our system of taxation is based upon
voluntary assessment and payment, not upon
distraint” (362 U.S. 167) Normally, both individual
and corporate taxpayers are permitted to assess
their own tax liability using the instructional tools
made available by the IRS and state and local
governments with the understanding that their selfevaluation may be audited for completeness and
accuracy and that penalties, interest and potentially
criminal sanctions can be imposed if the original
return is found to underreport tax liability and
sufficient disclosure has not provided to apprise the
regulatory agency of the taxpayer’s uncertainty in
taking the positions in question. Though the public
has always had a justified interest in preventing

Controversies Arising from Disclosing Uncertainty
An individual tax position may involve a
deduction or exclusion from income, the claim of a
tax credit, the use of a carry-forward or carry-back
loss, the classification of an entity, transfer pricing
allocation or a number of other assertions made on
a tax return for the purpose of minimizing income
tax liability. Because modern tax law is complex
and does not specifically address every conceivable
transaction structure or situation but, like GAAP,
institutes rules that companies must apply to their
respective industries and circumstances, managers
must make a conscious decision to report or not
report certain events in a tax return where
ambiguity exists regarding the specific application
of regulations.
In March 1975, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board issued Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 5, which requires firms
to accrue a contingent liability such as income taxes
payable if such liability is “probable” and “the
amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated”
(FAS 5, 8a-b). This guidance allowed substantial
flexibility for firms to gauge materiality in their
103
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2011/iss1/9

6

Muller: Government-Taxpayer Tensions in the Wake of FIN 48 and Schedule U

outright tax evasion, FIN 48 potentially serves as a
disincentive to corporations seeking to implement
tax savings strategies in that it exposes those
strategies to regulators who are interested in
collecting maximal revenue.
Beginning in 2011, companies will face even
further disclosure requirements: The largest U.S.
corporations will be required to submit a completed
Schedule of Uncertain Tax Positions (Form 1120)
to the IRS. Schedule UTP requires companies to
list all uncertain tax positions being taken in that
year’s return as well as in prior years’ returns from
2010 onward and, for each listed UTP, to indicate
whether the UTP represents a permanent or
temporary difference and whether the UTP
represents a “major” position, defined as 10 percent
or greater of the total amount of UTP reserves.
Corporations are also required to rank the UTPs
based on the size of the associated reserves.
Although the requirements of Schedule UTP for the
most part build upon the analysis prescribed by FIN
48, the instructions also indicate that a taxpayer
“must report on Schedule UTP a tax position taken
on its return for which no reserve for income tax is
recorded if the tax position is one which the
corporation or a related party determines the
probability of settling with the IRS to be less than
50 percent and, under applicable accounting
standards, no reserve was recorded in the audited
financial statements because the corporation
intends to litigate the tax position and has
determined that it is more likely than not to prevail
on the merits in the litigation” (Schedule UTP,
Instructions). That is, taxpayers must identify to the
IRS any position that is likely to be technically
objectionable even if they, their legal counsel and
their independent auditors believe the position will
likely be sustained in court.
FIN 48 and Schedule UTP have substantially
heightened disclosure requirements related to
corporate income taxes and the effects of each on
individual corporations are contingent on the
company’s attitude toward and usage of tax
planning in its overall business strategy. The
requirements will most likely have a meaningful
effect on the extent to which companies can lower
their effective tax rates as part of a general profitcreating strategy. Additionally, the IRS will be
provided with information that can be used in
guiding decisions including whether to audit a
corporate taxpayer and which positions, if any, to
challenge. Though the end result of the
requirements for investors is potentially a more
consistent and relevant set of income tax

information than has been previously available, it
may come at the expense of increased effective tax
rates. Many corporations implement tax
management policies that attempt to maximize
profits while minimizing reported tax expense. FIN
48 in some cases raises the reported income tax
expense by requiring companies to derecognize tax
benefits that would otherwise reduce tax expense.
Businesses with an interest in achieving maximum
tax compliance will likely face less of an impact
from FIN 48 and Schedule UTP than businesses
interested in minimizing tax exposure; their
conservatism may actually be advantageous in
reducing the likelihood of an IRS audit because the
disclosure requirements allow them to credibly
show a high level of confidence in their tax return.
Some tax-aggressive firms may refuse to admit or
disclose uncertainty at all; the responsibility of
ensuring the integrity of reported uncertainty will
now fall on independent auditors to uphold.
The broader notion that the government is now
demanding identification of UTPs is concerning to
many corporate taxpayers. Though the government
must necessarily draw funding from private
resources through taxation in order to provide
services to a public comprised of private
individuals, the United States was founded on the
principle that the government ought to carry out its
operations with the consent of the public.
The FASB stated in the basis for its conclusions on
FIN 48: “Some constituents asserted that requiring
a tabular reconciliation is not appropriate because it
would inappropriately provide a ‘roadmap’ for
taxing authorities. Those constituents analogized
the relationship between a taxpayer and a taxing
authority to the parties in a lawsuit … A
counterparty in a lawsuit is acting in the broader
public interest in regulating compliance with selfreporting income tax laws” (B64). While that
statement is not incorrect, a taxing authority is
privy to developing internal policies, interpretations
and methods that diverge from a totally neutral
reading of tax law and should not be treated as a
pinnacle of objectivity and fairness. Political,
societal and other pressures have the propensity to
affect the IRS just as they do the FASB and public
representatives.
Though it is in the public’s interest for the IRS
to deter noncompliance and tax evasion at both the
individual and entity level, the public similarly has
an interest in being able to continue to use the
corporate form of organization to conduct business
free of unfair and undue government intervention.
“All businesses want lower taxes. But businesses
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understand that their success as businesses depends
in part on what the government does – on
education, infrastructure, national security … Most
businesses understand that we have limited
resources, that we can’t raise taxes on individuals
to lower business taxes and that unsustainable longterm deficits hurt growth too,” offered Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner in an interview
following President Barack Obama’s 2011 State of
the Union address that suggested a future reduction
in U.S. corporate tax rates (Wessel 2011).
In requiring corporations to report the
technical results of an imprecise, broadly-conceived
accounting test, the IRS is opening the door to a
troubling environment where corporations with
uncertain tax positions are subject to a game of
courtroom ‘gotcha’ – the IRS can use Schedule
UTP disclosures to identify tax benefits that are
properly determined to be uncertain because
relevant tax law is not easily or directly applicable
to the event in question, and then use the very fact
that the taxpayer reported such uncertainty to sway
the court’s opinion or pressure the taxpayer into a
settlement. While it is of course entirely plausible
that the IRS might indeed use enhanced disclosure
solely to increase efficiency and to resolve disputes
quickly, there exist at this time no clear
mechanisms to protect the taxpayer from this type
of underhanded government action.

position meets the More-Likely-Than-Not
threshold, then the benefit of the position
recognized in the financial statements should be as
large as possible provided that amount is MoreLikely-Than-Not to be realized upon settlement.
Tax effects are recorded as reductions or additions
to income taxes payable or as deferred tax assets or
liabilities in accordance with SFAS No. 109. The
recognition or non-recognition status of tax
positions can change as the MLTN analysis is
applied in subsequent financial reporting periods
(740-10-35-3).
If a taxpayer takes positions on a tax return or
expects to do so but those positions do not meet the
MLTN threshold, the taxpayer must accrue
appropriate interest and penalties related to those
positions under ASC 740-10. ASC 740-10-25-56
requires that this interest be expensed separately of
general income tax expense. In the notes to the
financial statements, companies are required to
report the potential changes in the status of
unrecognized tax benefits, benefits related to UTPs
that are taken in a tax return but not recorded
because they fail the two-part FIN 48 test (740-1050-15d). Publicly traded companies are additionally
required to disclose changes in the gross amount of
unrecognized tax benefits as well as the amount of
unrecognized tax benefits that are realized because
the statute of limitations has expired for those
positions (740-10-50-15A).
Taxpayers must derecognize any and all tax
benefits that do not meet the MLTN threshold. A
valuation allowance is not permissible if
established solely because the sustainability of the
position is in question. This is significant in that the
potential value of any tax benefits that fail the
MLTN test are completely absent from the
consolidated financial statements. Even though any
potential tax benefit with a sustainability
probability greater than zero theoretically holds
some value to the company, many of these benefits
are confined to the notes to the financial statements
under ASC 740-10. If ultimately never challenged,
the income effects of non-MLTN tax benefits will
not be realized until all relevant statutes of
limitations expire; this ordinarily takes at least three
years starting from the end of the tax year in
question.

Current GAAP for Recognizing UTPs in
Financial Statements
FASB Interpretation No. 48 became effective
as part of U.S. GAAP for fiscal years beginning
after Dec. 15, 2006 and is currently incorporated
into ASC 740. Under ASC 740-10, firms must
evaluate each tax position to determine whether it is
more likely than not to be sustained upon
examination based on technical merit (740-10-553). Taxpayers may consider in this evaluation
whether they would litigate or appeal an adverse
judgment, but they are to presume that the
appropriate taxing authorities have “full knowledge
of all relevant information.” Detection risk is
ignored in the assessment of whether a position will
be sustained, but widely understood administrative
practices may be considered (e.g., for the sake of
convenience the IRS typically ignores certain
deviations from tax law such as the deduction of
assets below a taxpayer-determined dollar amount)
so that a company can record a related tax benefit
even though the position technically would not be
sustained if challenged (740-10-55-90). If any

Accounting Implications and Complexities
The most challenging component of FIN 48
from an accounting standpoint is probably the
charge to evaluate every tax position for
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sustainability upon examination. Retaining experts
in tax law can be prohibitively expensive for small
and medium-sized companies, and unreasonably
costly for large corporations that have to contend
with a multitude of potentially taxable events and a
variety of operating jurisdictions, each with its own
set of laws. ASC 740-10 requires tax positions to be
evaluated for each “unit of account,” the most
specific level at which taxpayers accumulate
information to support the tax return and at which it
anticipates a taxing authority will address the issue
(740-10-55-85). The Codification illustrates, for
example, a scenario where a research credit taken
on a tax return might represent the cumulative tax
effect of four separate research projects that are
individually and separately substantial in scope; if
documentation exists for each project, then each of
the four projects would be tested using FIN 48
versus testing the aggregate research credit only.
Each unit of account is tested ignoring the potential
canceling or amplifying effects of interrelated tax
positions. The determination of what constitutes a
unit of account is subjective and dependent on
relevant facts and circumstances.
Accountants also must deal with the difficult
problem of trying to develop an empirical
probability that a tax position will be approved
upon examination. Many tax positions are widely
accepted and clearly defendable using tax literature
and case law, but large companies in particular are
likely to find themselves wanting to take tax
positions that are more problematic. It can be
difficult in the latter case to quantitatively
benchmark the likelihood that the IRS or another
regulatory agency will accept a tax position when
tax law does not yield an obvious conclusion and
precedent is either nonexistent or not directly
comparable to the situation at hand. FIN 48 does
not prescribe a specific method of coming up with a
number other than to evaluate a tax position “based
on its technical merits” (FIN 48, B27). In its basis
for conclusions on FIN 48, the FASB writes, “the
Board does not believe that a legal tax position
must be obtained to demonstrate that the morelikely-than-not recognition threshold is met. The
Board believes that a tax opinion can be external
evidence supporting a management assertion and
that management should decide whether to obtain a
tax opinion after evaluating the weight of all
available evidence and the uncertainties of the
applicability of the relevant statutory or case law.
Other evidence, in addition to or instead of a tax
opinion, supporting the assertion also could be
obtained; the level of evidence that is necessary and

appropriate is a matter of judgment that depends on
all available information” (FIN 48, B34).
In particular, state and local income taxes must
come under substantially greater scrutiny internally
as a result of FIN 48’s requirements (Kwiatek).
Many states and locales utilize a complicated set of
criteria to determine whether a company has nexus
in that jurisdiction. Public Law 86-272 holds that
states are prohibited from “imposing a tax on or
measured by net income when an entity’s only
connection with the state is the solicitation of
orders or sales of tangible personal property.”
Many states have passed statues or regulations,
though, that invoke a principle known as
“economic nexus” whereby businesses can be
subject to some form of income tax even if not
physically present in that place. Some states have
argued that intangible holding companies create an
economic presence within their borders and attempt
then to collect income tax from the company.
Questions that states might ask in order to
determine whether or not a company has nexus
range from, “Does the business have an office,
agency, warehouse or other business location
owned or leased in the state?” to, “Does the
business have any employees or representatives
who use their in-state home to receive business
callers?” (State Tax Nexus). CPAs with Financial
Executives International observe: “A business can
face multiple overlapping tax-collecting
jurisdictions – countries, states, counties, cities and
special districts – and tangled rules in the various
tax authorities based on the type of business,
location or where the products and services will
ultimately be used” (Yrjanson, Tuthill 2010).
FIN 48 requires firms to identify and
potentially record a liability for taxes owed to a
state in which it has never before filed a return –
the statute of limitations never begins to run if a
return is never filed. The interpretation does allow
firms to consider widely accepted administrative
practice where nexus is concerned since several
states have implemented tax amnesty or voluntary
disclosure programs in which the “lookback”
period is reduced if firms initiate contact with the
jurisdiction to clarify whether they have nexus in
that jurisdiction (FIN 48 A14-15, Kwiatek).
Nevertheless, revisiting past years to determine
whether additional liabilities ought to be recorded
in accordance with FIN 48 for state and local
income taxes can present administrative difficulty
and will require CPAs to continually update their
understanding of local tax laws or consult lawyers
or tax professionals with the necessary expertise.
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FIN 48 creates additional complications
related to auditor independence. Accounting firms
that provide both auditing and tax planning
advisement services may find their perceived and
individual independence compromised. It is
unlikely that a CPA can be properly objective in
analyzing the sustainability of a tax position that he
or she advocated for the purpose of filing a tax
return (Stromsem). Smaller business in particular
may be forced to retain a tax professional in
addition to a CPA firm as a result of FIN 48.

requires firms to accrue material losses that are
“probable” and “reasonably estimated” and to
disclose those that are unlikely or not estimable.
With regard to UTPs, SFAS No. 5 was not always
useful to financial statement users because firms
enjoyed considerable flexibility when deciding
when and how to disclose and accrue tax liabilities
contingent upon possible audit (Gleason and Mills,
318). Investors typically have no access to IRS
audit information or progress, so under the SFAS
No. 5 approach of accounting for UTPs they were
afforded no meaningful information related to the
magnitude of any taxpayer-IRS disputes or the
likelihood of favorable or unfavorable resolution of
those disputes. Disagreements between taxpayers
and the IRS can be ongoing until the completion of
the audit and related settlements, often months or
years after the end of the tax year in question.
Gleason and Mills found through interviews
that the “primary consideration” in deciding
whether or not to disclose an expected loss related
to a tax position pre-FIN 48 was the size of the
anticipated loss after settlement. Other qualities of
an expected loss that led to disclosure were
extremely large IRS claims, public awareness of a
claim through the press and industry factors. A
popular benchmark for materiality among large,
frequently audited taxpaying firms was five percent
of “normal income,” the greater of actual income or
five percent of assets (Gleason and Mills 319). The
study concluded that though firms tended to
disclose the largest contingent tax liabilities
voluntarily, they often under-disclosed claims that
users and regulators would reasonably consider to
be material. It is worth noting that Gleason and
Mills ignored for the purposes of their study all
unaudited returns in part “because firms may
consider claims on unaudited returns to be too
remote to require disclosure,” a supposition that
FIN 48 markedly affected.
Another major accounting problem that FIN
48 attempted to rectify was the use of so-called “tax
cushions” to manipulate earnings. “Prior to the
issuance of this Interpretation,” the FASB wrote,
“tax positions were sometimes recognized in the
financial statements on an as-filed or to-be-filed tax
basis, such that current or deferred tax assets and
liabilities were immediately recognized when the
related tax position was taken (or expected to be
taken). In some cases, the ultimate realizability of
any current or deferred tax benefit was evaluated
and a valuation allowance was recorded” (FIN 48
B4). The term “tax cushion” ordinarily refers to the
difference between U.S. current income tax

Achieving Consistency Using FIN 48 versus
SFAS No. 5 and SFAS No. 109
According to the FASB, “Diverse accounting
practices had developed with respect to the
recognition and measurement of current and
deferred tax assets and liabilities in financial
statements [as of July 2005 when the FASB first
issued an exposure draft on uncertain tax positions].
That diversity resulted from the inconsistency in
the criteria used to recognize, derecognize, and
measure the economic benefits associated with tax
positions” (FIN 48, B2). Statement of Financial
Accounting Concepts No. 2, one of the documents
that guides the FASB in issuing accounting
pronouncements and interpretations, advises,
“Information about a particular enterprise gains
greatly in usefulness if it can be compared with
similar information about other enterprises …
Comparability between enterprises and consistency
in the application of methods over time increases
the informational value of comparisons of relative
economic opportunities or performance” (SFAC 2,
3). The stated primary goal of FIN 48, then, was to
achieve comparability in accounting for UTPs
among various enterprises. To this end, FIN 48 is
successful in that it establishes a consistent
methodology that had not existed previously.
From 1992 until the effective date of FIN 48 in
2006, the prevailing guidance for recording and
disclosing income tax liability had been SFAS No.
109, Accounting for Income Taxes. SFAS No. 109
superseded 1987’s FASB Statement No. 96, itself a
replacement of Accounting Principles Board
Opinion No. 11, issued in 1967. SFAS No. 109
made the significant change of requiring companies
to record temporary book-tax differences as assets
and liabilities in the balance sheet rather than as
deferred charges in the income statement. SFAS
No. 109 provided no guidance on how firms should
record UTPs, so most companies deferred to SFAS
No. 5, a generic statement on contingencies that
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expense reported in the financial statements and
total taxes due as reported on the corresponding
income tax return (Gleason and Mills 323).
Essentially, “tax cushions” allowed a company
to record for financial purposes a tax liability of,
say, $100 while only claiming $60 of liability on
the corresponding tax return, ignoring temporary
differences, on the basis that the IRS might in the
future disagree with the company’s treatment of a
position and require payment of $100 instead of
$60. The $60 would be expensed in the same fiscal
year as the tax return was filed – again,
disregarding any temporary differences for
simplicity – and the $40 would remain on the books
as a financial liability. The firm could then in a
later year release the $40 presuming that the
position would be successful and record income of
$40 for that subsequent year. The tax cushion fell
into the category of what Arthur Levitt termed
“cookie jar reserves” in describing prominent
methods of earnings management through
accounting techniques (Levitt 1998). Corporate
income tax returns are not publicly accessible, and
so investors had no way of determining the extent
to which the release of tax reserves was affecting
earnings. Research suggests that some firms that
might otherwise miss earning targets manage tax
expense in order to meet or exceed expectations
(Dhaliwal, et. al. 2004 445).

under APB 11 was the product of a relatively
simple calculation representing the difference
between the tax effects of all of the transactions
undertaken in a given year and the tax owed on the
corresponding tax return. No assets or liabilities
were recognized, and some users treated the
deferred entries as mere bookkeeping entries since
no amounts were listed as being receivable or
payable. APB 11 included no requirement to
establish a valuation allowance for uncertain tax
positions, and the effects of temporary differences
were accounted for at the tax rate in effect at the
time of the difference, even if the rates were
expected to be different at the time of reversal. A
scenario in which subscription to APB 11 would
have yielded a different tax expense than
subscription to SFAS 109 is illustrated in Appendix
C.
Though SFAS No. 109 does require
companies to record a valuation allowance, the
allowance is created to capture not the
sustainability of tax positions upon audit but the
potential for deferred tax assets or liabilities to be
unrealizable based on future circumstances. For
example, a deferred tax asset related to a carryforward loss might warrant a valuation allowance if
the ability of the company to generate taxable
income to be offset by the loss carried forward is
not definite.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board
defines assets as “probable future economic
benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity
as a result of past transactions or events” (SFAC 6,
25). The first characteristic of an asset, per
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6,
is that it “embodies a probable future benefit that
involves a capacity, singly or in combination with
other assets, to contribute directly or indirectly to
future net cash inflows” (SFAC 6, 26). Using this
definition, FIN 48 properly holds that a claimed tax
benefit should not be recognized in a company’s
financial statements if it is not probable that the
benefit will be realized. Instead, a liability should
be accrued representing the probable taxes payable
in the future as well as any associated penalties and
interest.
If the accounting treatment of the tax
consequence of an event is to fairly reflect the
underlying reality, though, the analysis prescribed
by FIN 48 is improper as it tests not the holistic
probability that a tax position will be sustained but
rather the theoretical probability that a tax position
would be sustained provided regulatory agencies
had the same information as the taxpayer. In its

Asset/Liability Approach to Deferred Taxes
The prevailing guidance for recording the
income tax effects of an event is Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, issued in
February 1992. Under SFAS No. 109, tax
consequences of events where no temporary
difference occurs are recorded as tax expense – or a
current tax asset if a refund is expected – in the
same period as the taxable event. When the tax
basis of an asset or liability becomes different from
its reported amount in the financial statements
because of a temporary difference, a deferred tax
asset or liability is recorded in the balance sheet. “A
deferred tax liability or asset represents the increase
or decrease in taxes payable or refundable in future
years as a result of temporary differences and
carryforwards at the end of the current year” (SFAS
109, Summary).
The predecessor to SFAS No. 109, Accounting
Principles Bulletin 11, required companies to
record deferred charges in the income statement
instead of in the balance sheet. The “deferred tax”
account that appeared in the income statement
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conclusions supporting FIN 48, the Board writes,
“at this time, it is preferable to separately evaluate
tax positions for recognition against a recognition
threshold and to provide separate measurement
guidance for positions that qualify for recognition”
versus using an expected-outcome measurement
(B26). Disregarding the effects of disclosure on the
decisions of regulators, FIN 48 requires firms to
record liabilities that are not actually expected.
“Implementation of the Proposed
Interpretation will have the effect of consistently
overstating the tax accruals for uncertain tax
positions in direct conflict with the conceptual
framework of the Board,” wrote one chief tax
officer of a major company in a comment letter to
the FASB (Stecker 2005, 4). While it is certainly
possible that FIN 48 could indeed result in an
overstatement of liabilities related to UTPs, such is
not a necessary outcome (Mills, et. al. 2009, 26).
For example, if a firm determines that the
possibility of audit is 100 percent and that the
likelihood that an all-or-nothing claimed tax benefit
will be sustained is 60 percent, the firm will record
a FIN 48 liability of zero even though there is a 40
percent chance that the full amount of the claimed
benefit will be remitted to a collecting agency in
the future. In such a scenario, FIN 48 actually
understates the theoretical liability. When the
probability of audit is greater than zero, a FIN 48
analysis may understate, overstate or correctly state
the tax liability depending on the difference
between the recognized and claimed benefit, the
probability of audit and the probability that the
recognized and unrecognized portions of the
claimed tax position will be sustained on audit.
Though FIN 48 does require firms to disclose
information that may assist the IRS in gauging the
extent to which the firm has claimed tax benefits
that are not likely to be sustained upon audit, the
FIN 48 liability in aggregated form is not especially
informative to any one government (Mills, et. al.
2009 27). While FIN 48 requires firms to test each
tax position individually, they are not required to
actually disclose reserves associated with any
position and so the FIN 48 requirements alone
could perhaps signal a government audit but
probably would not spur the inspection of specific
positions.
Where certain large transactions are
concerned, it is possible that a reported FIN 48
liability could represent the effect of one large
event. For example, companies sometimes engage
in what is known as a “tax-free spin-off” when they
divest a portion of their business by establishing a

brand new company with new management.
Because the business is not sold, the parent
company does not realize a taxable capital gain on
the sale. If the tax-free status of such a transaction
is questionable, the potential capital gain might
wholly or largely comprise a FIN 48 liability for
the parent company and in such a situation FIN 48
could by itself serve as a “roadmap” for the IRS. It
is likely, though, that an IRS might be triggered
regardless of FIN 48 simply because the major
transaction took place at all. Additionally, FIN 48
disclosure requirements do not require a breakdown
of the taxes owed to various local, state, national
and international regulatory bodies.
Where FIN 48 draws the line in terms of
disclosure requirements, however, Schedule UTP
continues. Because Schedule UTP does require
taxpayers to identify and describe each UTP
individually, it is possible that its existence
increases detection risk substantially. If this is true,
the technical merits of a position as well as
administrative practice will indeed be the only
factors governing whether or not a claimed but
uncertain tax benefit is realized and FIN 48 will be
effective in depicting the actual tax benefits and
liabilities likely to be ultimately realized. The
extent to which the IRS pursues various UTPs
using the information provided by taxpayers of
various size – for tax year 2010, only firms with
assets of $100 million or greater will complete the
form – is not yet clear. It is important to note that in
the final version of Schedule UTP, the IRS will not
be provided with a dollar amount of the potential
reversal, but will be alerted to UTPs that represent
an amount greater than 10 percent of the entire sum
of reported UTPs. The IRS, then, will not have the
fullest set of data necessary to perform an exact
cost-benefit analysis and operate most efficiently.
Usefulness of Tax Disclosures to Financial
Statement Users
At this time, it is generally impossible for a
third-party user of a set of GAAP financial
statements to discern with confidence the cash
amount of taxes paid by a corporation to a given
government for a given tax year (McGill, Outslay
2002 1131, 1136). Though the total amount of cash
payments attributable to owed taxes is identified in
the statement of cash flows, that number represents
tax payments to multiple jurisdictions related to
multiple years. U.S. tax returns are not made
available to the public, so users of financial
statements are forced to try to deduce an estimate
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of taxes paid for a certain tax year using the cash
outflow for income taxes number in the statement
of cash flows in conjunction with reported income
tax expense and any related footnotes. Because
neither amount will necessarily approximate the
cash amount of taxes paid to the IRS or any other
regulatory agency, the public may jump to incorrect
conclusions. In a Nov. 30, 2010 speech on the floor
of the United States Senate, Sen. Bernie Sanders (IVt.) said, “Last year, ExxonMobil made $19 billion
in profit. Guess what. They paid zero in taxes. They
got a $156 million refund from the IRS.” The
company’s 2009 10-K does indeed show that the
U.S. portion of income tax expense for fiscal year
2009 was negative $156 million, but this number
represents the finalization of tax bills from previous
years as well as current and deferred tax expense
for 2009. Forbes reported that according to an
Exxon spokesperson, the company will owe a
“substantial 2009 tax liability” once the final tax
bill is figured but declined to offer a number
(Helman 2010). It is also worth noting that
ExxonMobil booked $15,165 million of non-U.S.
income tax for 2009. It is not uncommon for large,
international companies to siphon taxable income
to countries with lower tax rates through the use of
transfer pricing and complex business structures.
Search engine giant Google, for example, paid an
overseas tax rate of just 2.4 percent in 2009; its
transfer pricing arrangements were approved by the
IRS in 2006 (Drucker 2010).

circumstances are: when a state tax official or state
or local law enforcement agency requires such
information “for the administration of State tax
laws for the purpose of, and only to the extent
necessary in, the administration of such laws” (U.S.
Code §6103 d-1), when a shareholder owning more
than one percent of a corporation requests the
information (6103 e-1-D-iii), when information is
requested by the chair of a Congressional
committee or the President or an appointee thereof
(6103 f,g), when certain federal officers or
employees require information for tax
administration (6103 h) and when the information
is to be used in a criminal or national security
investigation at the federal level (6103 i). Under
none of these circumstances is the designated
recipient of the information permitted to share it;
i.e. a shareholder of a corporation may not obtain
the corporation’s tax return legally and then publish
it or disseminate information to a third party.
Current law does not allow for prospective
investors, less-than-one-percent investors or
creditors to access a corporation’s tax return under
normal circumstances. In 2003, Rep. Lloyd Doggett
(D-TX) introduced in the House of Representatives
a bill titled, Corporate Accountability Tax Gap of
2003 which would “…permit inspection of true
corporate tax liability and understand the tax
strategies undertaken by corporations, to discourage
abusive tax sheltering activities, and to restore
investor confidence in publicly traded
corporations” (U.S. Congress 2003). The Act
would have made public certain information
including net corporate income tax, taxable income
and certain book-tax differences but it has not yet
been brought to a vote.
Some believe that public dissemination of tax
returns would be a good idea on the basis that
“sunlight is the best disinfectant” or that
publicizing tax returns would increase the political
pressure for tax reform. Others believe that
providing information to investors that extends
beyond the requirements of GAAP would improve
the functionality of financial markets (Lenter, et. al.
2003 814). Because the IRS is the government
agency responsible for enforcing tax law and it
obviously has access to return data, it is not likely
that making tax returns public would improve the
ability of the government to enforce laws; §6103 of
the U.S. Code already allows for federal agencies to
obtain relevant data from a tax return where
appropriate. While it is possible that financial
experts might be able to obtain information
regarding income tax expense calculations beyond

Confidentiality of Corporate Tax Returns
Since 1894 (Bernasek 2010), the federal
government has been prohibited from disclosing
any portion of an individual or corporate tax return
with limited and carefully defined exceptions. Until
1976, income tax returns were classified as public
records; though not readily accessible to the public,
they were permitted to be inspected by certain
government agencies and parties with a material
interest in the return subject to Treasury regulations
and the president’s executive order (Lenter, et. al.
2003 813). The Tax Reform Act of 1976, a
response to allegations that the Nixon
administration had improperly used tax return
information against its political opponents,
eliminated executive branch control over tax return
disclosure and reclassified tax returns to
confidential status (Lenter, et. al. 2003 813). Today,
there are few circumstances under which the IRS
may release information from a tax return without
the express consent of the taxpayer. The major
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what GAAP provides, FIN 48 has already reduced
the ability of corporations to manage earnings
through valuation allowances to the extent that
viewing the tax return would not enhance markedly
the quality of information required by GAAP.
An interesting argument for making at least a
portion of corporate tax returns public is that to do
so would encourage tax compliance because
corporate managers would be wary to practice
aggressive tax avoidance with the understanding
that stakeholders might frown upon such behavior
as evidence of bad corporate citizenship. While
there is evidence that both customers and
stockholders consider a social responsibility and
corporate citizenship in decisions to purchase from
or invest in a company, the evidence does not
suggest that the financial performance of
corporations is materially affected by these
perceptions or that the dutiful payment of taxes is
of particular importance to these stakeholders
(Lenter, et. al. 2003 820). The argument is also
weakened by the consideration that public
disclosure of tax returns might actually incite
companies to decrease their tax bills for fear of
being compared by investors to competitors with
smaller tax bills.
The most sustainable argument for publicizing
corporate tax returns, then, is that doing so might
encourage political and public pressure for fairness
in the tax system by exposing inequities among
companies or industries or discrepancies between
the goals and outcomes of particular tax laws.
While such would likely have positive outcomes,
the downsides of making tax returns public need to
be considered as well.
Both the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Treasury Department responded negatively
to the 2002 inquiry of Sen. Charles Grassley (RIowa), a letter suggesting that regulators and the
public might benefit from making corporate tax
returns public (Lenter, et. al. 2003 804). Lenter, et.
al. suggests the following as primary reasons to
retain confidentiality of corporate tax returns:
corporations might withhold important but sensitive
information in reporting their tax liability if that
information were to be publicly available, financing
and operating strategies of corporations would be
openly revealed to competitors and some
corporations might choose to become private or
even relocate to a foreign country in order to avoid
disclosing such information. The issue, then, is
whether the privacy of corporations ought to be
trumped by the federal government’s interest in
establishing a fair tax system and collecting an

appropriate level of revenue in accordance with the
design of that system.
Government/Taxpayer Relationship
By its nature, the relationship between
taxpayers and their government – a government
comprised of and controlled by taxpayers - is
complicated because while it is in the interest of
taxpayers in the aggregate for the government to
collect enough revenue to provide the services they
have, in theory, demanded of it, each individual
taxpayer is inclined to pay as little as possible. The
task of the IRS, then, is to perform audits at a rate
that deters tax evasion, encourages maximum
compliance and minimizes the cost of
administration.
In fiscal year 2008, the most recent year for
which comprehensive data is available, the IRS
employed 20,722 enforcement officers and
collected a total of $56.4 billion through automatic
underreporting techniques – for example,
comparing W-2 and 1099 forms submitted from
banks, investment firms and employers with the
information supplied by taxpayers – and traditional
examination techniques. 1.01% of individual
returns were audited, with an emphasis on higherincome taxpayers; 5.57% of tax returns reporting an
income of $1 million or higher were examined,
compared to 0.95% of returns reporting an income
of less than $200,000. The audit rate is low for
smaller corporations – only 0.95% of corporations
listing less than $10 million in assets were audited
in FY 2008, but 15.3% of corporations listing assets
greater than $10 million were examined; the rate
rises to 27.4% for corporations listing assets of over
$250 million (Fiscal).
After being notified of the results of an
examination, corporate and individual taxpayers
have an opportunity to substantiate their claims; the
IRS may accept the tax return as filed, propose a
settlement with the taxpayer or disallow certain tax
treatments. The taxpayer is then afforded the
opportunity to contact the Appeals office of the IRS
or dispute the IRS’s decision with a formal trial in a
court of law.
FIN 48 and Schedule UTP stand to affect
nearly every step of the audit process. While the
specifics of the IRS audit selection methods are
purposefully not made public so as to not tip off
potential tax evaders on what constitutes a red flag,
the IRS has been straightforward in its message that
agents will indeed use Schedule UTP to help guide
decisions regarding which corporations to audit and
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which tax positions in particular to examine in that
audit. In April 2010, IRS Commissioner Doug
Shulman said that taxpayers and tax authorities
both desire a balanced tax administration system
that provides “an efficient use of government and
taxpayer resources by focusing on the issues and
taxpayers that pose the greatest risk of tax
noncompliance” (Shulman 2010). In that same
address, Shulman stated, “An important thing for
you to realize is that a major goal of this proposal
[an early draft of Schedule UTP that required
taxpayers to list a maximum tax adjustment – that
requirement was removed from the final
instructions] is to use the schedule for audit
selection, not just as information in audits.”
Taxpayers are also concerned that Schedule
UTP implicitly provides the IRS with privileged
information. In preparing their financial statements
in accordance with GAAP, corporations must
frequently consult the expertise and counsel of a tax
attorney, an accounting firm, or both so that it can
support the MLTN status of claimed tax benefits
recorded in the financial statements to its financial
statement auditor. Schedule UTP requires taxpayers
to identify not only benefits that fail the MLTN test
on their technical merits but also benefits that
would fail the MLTN were it not for the firm’s
intent to litigate an adversarial opinion of the IRS.
In a very real sense, then, a corporation is required
to unveil to the IRS the opinions of its legal counsel
– that is, the opinion that a position is not MLTN to
succeed on technical merit even if it can, perhaps,
succeed on legal merit – before any sort of trial
begins. As one scholar articulates, “Ambiguity in
the tax law is resolved by litigation – a system of
adversaries. For effective common law to develop,
courts must hear ‘zealous advocacy’ from both
sides in every case. Tax law is no exception.”
(Jones 799).
Empirical research finds that many companies
released a material amount of tax reserves shortly
prior to the effective date of FIN 48 (Blouin, et. al.
2006, 808). The research supports the notion that
many companies desire to minimize their FIN 48
liability. A desire to reduce the kind of IRS scrutiny
that might weaken a corporation’s negotiating
positions is a probable contributing factor to this
phenomenon; the authors also consider a desire of
companies to record the release of any lingering
excessive tax reserves as an increase in income
statement earnings versus as a cumulative change
in accounting principle adjustment to retained
earnings that would have no effect on current-year
income.

It should be noted that FIN 48 and Schedule
UTP do not necessarily yield a disadvantage for
every corporate taxpayer in every circumstance. On
the contrary, the enhanced disclosure requirements
for the first time allow a taxpayer to credibly
indicate to the IRS that all or most of the positions
taken in the tax return are MLTN to be sustained.
“FIN 48 re-enforced my belief that taking risky tax
positions is not in a company’s best interest,” wrote
one tax professional wishing to remain anonymous.
“I realize there are grey areas and differences of
opinion can exist, but I’ve never lost an issue I’ve
researched and built a solid supporting position for
… My comfort level for taking a position is closer
to a ‘should’ position and thus a FIN 48 reserve
would be zero.” The 2009 paper by Mills, et. al.
finds that “taxpayers with strong positions have
higher expected payoffs post-FIN 48 than they did
pre-FIN 48” (29) because the government has less
incentive to audit a company showing little or no
uncertainty under FIN 48 compared to a company
that provides no credible disclosure of position
sustainability at all, and certainty compared to a
company showing a high level of uncertainty.
Observed Attitudes of the IRS
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
IRS may obtain tax accrual workpapers under 26
U.S.C. §7602, which authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury to summon and “examine any books,
papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material” to a particular tax inquiry
(United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 813). The
Court found that, “It is the responsibility of the IRS
to determine whether the corporate taxpayer, in
completing its return, has stretched a particular tax
concept beyond what is allowed. Records that
illuminate any aspect of the return – such as the tax
accrual workpapers at issue in this case – are
therefore highly relevant to legitimate IRS inquiry”
(815). In that same case, the Court considered
whether some sort of accountant-client privilege
ought to be enacted, but found that because
independent auditors, unlike lawyers, ultimately
bear responsibility to the public over the client, “To
insulate from disclosure a certified public
accountant’s interpretation of the client’s financial
statements would be to ignore the significance of
the accountant’s role as a disinterested analyst
charged with public obligations” (818).
Since the Supreme Court ruling, the IRS has
affirmed a policy of restraint with regard to tax
accrual workpapers. “Audit or tax accrual
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workpapers should normally be sought only when
such factual data cannot be obtained from the
taxpayer’s records or from available third parties,
and then only as a collateral source for factual
data,” the IRS writes in its Internal Revenue
Manual (4.10.20.3.1). “Audit or tax accrual
workpapers should be requested with discretion and
not as a matter of standard examining procedure.”
This policy was first asserted in 1984, but was
adjusted in 2002 to exclude “listed transactions”
from restraint as a response to the growing
preponderance of high-profile corporate tax
shelters. After FIN 48 became effective in
December 2006, there was much concern within the
accounting profession that the IRS would be
tempted to utilize FIN 48 workpapers and renege
on its self-imposed policy of restraint. In May
2007, the IRS published a “FIN 48 Implications
LB&I Field Examiners’ Guide” which noted: “The
disclosures required under FIN 48 should give the
Service a somewhat better view of a taxpayer’s
uncertain tax positions; however, the disclosures
still do not have the specificity that would allow a
perfect view of the issues and amounts at risk.” The
guide continues, “Even with the lack of specificity,
tax footnotes included in financial statements,
including FIN 48 disclosures, should be carefully
reviewed and analyzed as part of the audit planning
process … Revenue Agents should not be reluctant
to pursue matters mentioned in FIN 48 disclosures,
but should be mindful of our policy of restraint on
Tax Accrual Workpapers and not cross over the
boundaries contained there.” The guide also notes
that some taxpayers desire expedient resolution of
uncertain tax issues since a large FIN 48 liability
can have a negative impact on the financial
statements.
In 2009, the issue of work product privilege
was applied to FIN 48 in USA v. Textron. Textron
is a publicly traded company audited by Ernst &
Young; in 2003, the IRS audited Textron’s 2001
tax return and issued an administrative summons to
obtain tax accrual work papers under §7602
because it was suspected by the IRS that Textron
had engaged in sale-in, lease-out transactions as
well as other “listed transactions.” The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that Textron’s
work papers are not protected under the work
product privilege because tax accrual work papers
are prepared primarily for the sake of calculating
items to be included in financial statements and not
in anticipation of a court trial (24). The Supreme
Court decided not to review the appeal, letting the
ruling of the appeals court stand.

The 2009 Textron case differs from the 1984
Arthur Young case in that Textron’s work papers
were produced by Textron’s tax department with
consultation from outside legal counsel; in the
Arthur Young case, the work papers were prepared
by the auditor and so the issue of work product
privilege was never considered. The driving
contention in the Textron case is not the relevance
of the tax accrual work papers to the IRS audit but
whether or not the work papers can be considered
documentation that is prepared because of the
prospect of litigation. Essentially, the First Circuit
court’s ruling holds that the work required to
document a FIN 48 analysis for the sake of proving
proper financial statement to auditors can be
requested and summoned by the IRS in order to
determine whether or not a tax benefit holds merit.
Because managers of publicly traded companies
need to support the assertions contained in financial
statements in order to obtain an unqualified opinion
from an auditor, they are left no choice but to
prepare documentation of uncertain tax positions
that incorporates the opinions of legal counsel
knowing that such documentation could ultimately
be used against them by the IRS.
In response to these concerns, the IRS in
October 2010 issued Announcement 2010-76,
which expanded the Service’s existing policy of
restraint; the announcement affirms the ability of
agents to request documentation of legal support
for positions, but permits taxpayers to withhold a
document if it “is otherwise privileged under the
attorney-client privilege, the tax advice privilege in
§7525 of the Code, or the work product doctrine
and the document was provided to an independent
auditor as part of an audit of the taxpayer’s
financial statements.” That policy became effective
Sept. 24, 2010. Once again, the policy of restraint
does not apply if unusual circumstances exist or if
the taxpayer has claimed the benefits of one or
more “listed transactions.” The IRS also permits
taxpayers to redact information from requested tax
reconciliation work papers if that information
contains specific calculations and reserve amounts
related to Schedule UTP.
On March 23, 2011, the IRS issued a
“Frequently Asked Questions on Schedule UTP” on
its website; the document clarified that the policy of
restraint outlined in Announcement 2010-76
applies to documents requested by Appeals as well
as documents requested by Counsel after a Tax
Court petition has been filed by a taxpayer.
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Initial Schedule UTP Proposal and Feedback

of striving for consistent, objective interpretation of
the law.

On April 19, 2010, the IRS released a draft of
Schedule UTP that would have, if fully enacted
without revisions, required corporations listing
assets of $10 million or greater to disclose UTPs to
the IRS beginning in tax year 2010. The initial draft
required filers to complete the same analysis as is
required in the final version, but also required
corporations to calculate and report a Maximum
Tax Adjustment for each UTP – the maximum
amount in dollars that might be retained by the IRS
should the IRS prevail in challenging the position.
After an open comment period, the IRS made
adjustments to the draft that eliminated the
Maximum Tax Adjustment requirement, allowed
corporations to exclude UTPs that were not
reserved under FIN 48 because of administrative
practice and scaled back the filing requirements so
that only those companies listing $100 million or
greater in assets would be subject to the
requirements immediately. Corporations listing $50
million in assets will fall under the requirements
beginning in tax year 2012, and corporations listing
$10 million will begin filing Schedule UTP in tax
year 2014. A final major adjustment in the final
draft is the elimination of the requirement for
corporations to report to the IRS the rationale for
taking an uncertain position. Critics had argued that
such a requirement would force corporations to
reveal privileged information to the IRS. The final
version requires corporations to explain the nature
of the uncertainty for each UTP but does not ask
them to justify their decision to take the position.
The upsides of Schedule UTP from a public
perspective are not trivial. The schedule will allow
the IRS to audit more efficiently by concentrating
its resources on resolving those issues that are most
likely to exploit inconsistencies and ambiguities in
the tax code. The manager of accounting policy and
financial research for FEI writes that a review of
reported UTPs will allow the IRS Large Business &
International Division to potentially undergo the
process of “publishing guidance necessary to
eliminate uncertainty wherever possible, as well as
identifying areas for possible legislative changes”
(Wei 2010). Both of these proposed uses of
Schedule UTP would be legitimate and welcome.
There is concern, though, that another use of the
schedule involves the executive branch equivalent
of judicial activism – proactively challenging tax
positions in court or in negotiation in such a way as
to maximize present and future collections instead

Interactions Between Schedule UTP and Restraint
Policy
IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman stated to the
American Bar Association that the IRS will not
seek documents that would otherwise be privileged,
nor will it procure drafts of issue descriptions or
information regarding the ranking of issues used in
preparation of Schedule UTP (Shulman 2010). The
stated goal of the IRS is to create certainty for the
government and taxpayers alike sooner and to
operate efficiently and effectively. In a September
directive, the Deputy Commissioner for Services
and Enforcement of the IRS instructed personnel to
“approach UTPs on audit keeping in mind their
responsibility to apply the law as it currently exist,
not how we would like it to be. We must do this
without bias in favor of the government or the
taxpayer” (Miller 2010). Though these words
soothe the fear that the government will use
Schedule UTP to exploit ambiguities in tax law, the
structural system created by the policy relies
heavily on a fallible promise. Once a corporation
has acknowledged that a tax position is uncertain,
the IRS has full reign to use that information to
sway a court.
The LB&I Subgroup of the IRS Advisory
Council reported in November 2010 that it
disagrees with the issuance of Schedule UTP and
finds “significant challenges to overcome to make
sure that examination teams utilize the information
contained on this schedule in a reasonable manner”
(IRS Advisory Council). There is also legitimate
concern about the consequences of Schedule UTP
contents being released to foreign governments.
The release of tax information between countries
can trigger heavy scrutiny of transfer pricing
arrangements that affect the taxability of income in
various international jurisdictions, and jurisdictions
outside of the U.S. might use the information
aggressively to the disadvantage of corporations.
The IRS has responded to this concern by noting
that only under very limited conditions would
release of Schedule UTP data to other jurisdictions
be considered.
Role of Auditors in Government-Taxpayer
Relationship
The largest U.S. corporations almost
exclusively employ four global accounting firms:
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Deloitte & Touch, Ernst & Young, KPMG and
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. These firms have
collectively become known as the “Big Four”
because they collectively provide advisory, tax and
auditing services to a vast majority of publicly
traded and large private companies. The SEC does
not require listed companies to choose these firms
as auditors, but the Big Four have established
globalized capabilities and competencies that
regional firms cannot match. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 forbids any accounting firm from
simultaneously auditing and providing certain nonassurance to publicly-traded corporations. Many
publicly-traded corporations therefore utilize two
Big Four firms at once, each providing a different
set of services. Considering that two international
companies engaged in a merger or acquisition will
likely each wish to retain one accounting firm to
perform auditing services and one to perform due
diligence services, a minimum of four global
accounting firms must exist to provide support
services to the two companies as they join together.
Accounting firms play a major role in
determining the extent to which the IRS can
successfully identify UTPs by certifying that the
company’s FIN 48 analysis has been sound. From
an advisement perspective, accounting firms
providing tax services can sell tax shelter packages
or instruct tax avoidance strategies and provide
legal and technical support for uncertain positions
that can be used to justify categorizing a tax
position as MLTN to be sustained upon audit. From
an auditing stance, the firms bear the responsibility
of certifying that a company’s financial statements
comply with GAAP and, by extension, ASC 740.
Because the MLTN test involves a subjective
judgment of the empirical justifiability of a tax
position, the opinions of the tax advisor and auditor
directly dictate whether or not a company will be
required to report a given tax position to the IRS on
Schedule UTP and subject that position to special
scrutiny. The value of Schedule UTP, then, depends
completely on how accounting firms interpret and
enforce ASC 740 and the MLTN test specifically.
Because the Big Four exercise what amounts
to an oligopoly over providing accounting and
auditing services to the largest U.S. corporations,
government agencies have a limited ability to
sanction firms that violate policies. The 2003
KPMG tax shelter investigation illustrates this
perfectly. Though the Senate found that KPMG had
indeed knowingly sold tax shelters to clients, the
government agreed to dismiss criminal prosecution
of the firm so long as it paid $456 million in fines,

restitution and penalties and complied with other
conditions including the termination of two tax
practice areas (IRS Notice 2005-83). Following the
2002 collapse of Arthur Andersen, the risk of
another global accounting firm shuttering its doors
posed too great a risk to the economy and so the
government instead held KPMG to an impossible
ultimatum. The Department of Justice’s charges
against 13 individual KPMG employees were later
thrown out after a judge ruled that the U.S.
improperly pressured KPMG to not pay the legal
fees of its former employees. The case illustrates
the tension between the desire of the government to
influence the practices of accounting firms and the
competing desire to have effective competition
among large accounting firms. Though accountants
and the FASB are in theory independent of the
government and of clients, both are subject to
political pressures. Accounting policies and
disclosure requirements can either undermine or aid
the enforcement techniques of governmental
agencies and particularly the IRS, as illustrated by
the Service’s use of FIN 48 requirements to justify
the issuance of Schedule UTP. Accounting
practices and standards do not exist in a vacuum;
they need to be useable and relevant to a system of
stakeholders with different and sometimes
conflicting needs.
The fact that the collapse of any one of the Big
Four firms would pose a great risk to the global and
domestic economy holds foreboding connotations
for a public that depends on their auditing services.
Though regulatory agencies like the IRS and SEC
have the ability to sanction or press charges against
corporations, they rely heavily on the notion that
corporate financial statements have undergone
reasonable verification by a Big Four firm.
Related Topics in Accounting
Accounting for income taxes is distinguished
from accounting for most other types of
transactions because income taxes are calculated
using non-GAAP conventions. In discussing the
issues associated with providing information to
third-party users based on accounting estimates
when the third-party user’s reaction to and use of
that information may well affect the extent to which
the original estimate becomes a certainty, though, it
is useful to consider the accounting treatment of
contingent liabilities associated with litigation, the
environment, and multiemployer plans.
Additionally, consideration must be given to the
fact that the U.S. will likely adopt International
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Financial Reporting Standards to replace GAAP
within this decade. Should the change come to pass,
differences in accounting for uncertain income tax
positions will affect the information collection
techniques of the IRS.

ever be threatened because the potential plaintiffs
are unaware that they have a valid complaint or
choose not to press charges. Indeed, it would be
nonsensical for a company to disclose and accrue a
loss related to a lawsuit that would not even be
brought were the company not openly admitting to
having wronged another party. In such a case, the
accounting framework would actually lead to the
creation of a liability rather than being the
mechanism that records it.
Where taxes are concerned, though, GAAP is
requiring companies to do just that – create a
liability that is nonexistent for practical purposes
because of a theoretical application of accounting
standards. Accruing or disclosing losses or
foregone benefits related to UTPs would be
appropriate only if the likelihood of those positions
being audited is 100% independently of the loss
disclosure.
While disclosures related to ongoing litigation
do have the potential to give an opposing party’s
counsel insight into whether the company considers
a loss reasonably possible or even probable, the
judgment surrounding those disclosures is based on
circumstances as they exist at the time the financial
statements are compiled, not as they might exist
after the statements are released. ASC 740 in
conjunction with Schedule UTP creates an iterative
effect whereby the accounting treatment affects the
event being accounted for – a very troubling side
effect considering the information provided by
financial reporting is intended to be historical. The
FASB writes: “To the extent that financial
reporting provides information that helps identify
relatively efficient and inefficient users of
resources, aids in assessing relative returns and
risks of investment opportunities, or otherwise
assists in promoting efficient functioning of capital
and other markets, it helps to create a favorable
environment for capital formation decisions.
However, investors, creditors, and others make
those decisions, and it is not a function of financial
reporting to try to determine or influence the
outcomes of those decisions” (SFAC 1, 33). The
FASB addresses taxing authorities specifically:
“Although both taxing authorities and rate-making
bodies often use the information in financial
statements for their purposes, both also have
statutory authority to require the specific
information they need to fulfill their functions and
do not need to rely on information provided to
other groups” (26).

Litigation Exposure
SFAS No. 5 provides guidelines that are
intended to apply directly to the accounting for
pending or threatened litigation. As mentioned
earlier, the standard requires companies to accrue a
loss if and only if the incurrence of a liability or
impairment of an asset is probable and the amount
of the loss can be reasonably estimated. The
standard defines probable as: “The future event or
events are likely to occur” (SFAS 5, 3a). If a loss is
not accrued but there is a reasonable probability
that a loss has occurred, disclosure must be made
indicating the nature of the contingency and the
range of the loss, if an estimate can be made (10).
Contingent gains are never recorded in a
company’s financial statements, though careful
disclosure must be made in the case that a gain is
probable or reasonably possible (17a, b).
The FASB clarifies in SFAS No. 5 that, “The
filing of a suit or formal assertion of a claim or
assessment does not automatically indicate that
accrual of a loss may be appropriate. The degree of
an unfavorable outcome must be assessed” (SFAS
5, 37). The statement appropriately suggests that
accrual of a contingency should be based on an
independent, technical analysis of the situation and
not on the formal actions of an antagonist party.
Under this thinking, corporations should not write
off tax benefits that have been taken under the
belief that they are consistent with prevailing tax
law simply because the IRS or another regulatory
agency has challenged the validity of those
benefits.
The current guidelines for recording UTPs
differs from the guidelines for recording the
potential effect of future lawsuits in that tax
benefits must be scrutinized even if management
does not believe that the benefits will be
challenged. SFAS No. 5 states: “With respect to
unasserted claims and assessments, an enterprise
must determine the degree of probability that a suit
may be filed or a claim or assessment may be
asserted and the possibility of an unfavorable
outcome … If the judgment is that assertion is not
probable, no accrual or disclosure would be
required” (38). Corporations need not disclose or
accrue losses related to litigation that is unlikely to
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Again, while the public would like for all
companies to voluntarily identify and clean up any
environmental damage they cause, it would not
make sense for companies to report to investors and
creditors financial liabilities that have a remote
probability of ever materializing. It is possible that
laws becoming effective in the future will create
environmental liabilities for certain companies, but
to record an obligation related to a potential-butnot-certain legal requirement would not reflect the
underlying realities in which the company operates
and SFAS 143 appropriately requires that
judgments be made in accordance with existing
interpretations of existing laws. Financial
statements should reflect the financial and
economic position of a company as it really is, not
as it would be under ideal or contrived
circumstances. Ideally, all customers would satisfy
debts owed to a company and an allowance for bad
debts would be unnecessary; in a worst-case
scenario, all debts would prove uncollectible and
revenues would be recorded only when cash is
received. Neither scenario is the most probable,
though, and the current accounting system strives to
best represent the actual probability of collecting
the receivables rather than defer to extreme
possibilities. Moreover, the probability that
individual accounts will be collected is typically
estimated using factors like the creditworthiness of
the debtor, the size of the debt, the debtor’s
payment history and the length of time that has
elapsed since the debt arose. The obligation to
satisfy the debt has no relation to whether or not the
company believes the debt is collectible. Similarly,
the obligation to pay taxes associated with income
realized in a given transaction or event is unrelated
to whether or not the company or the IRS believes
that obligation is real.
Of course, the enforcement of tax law by the
IRS is usually the predicator of tax liabilities, but
the associated actions would not create a liability
were there not a legal framework detailing and
mandating taxation policies in the first place. There
are two factors that predicate the recording or
disclosure of a liability where legal or
environmental liabilities are concerned: that the
liability arises out of a valid mechanism – an onthe-books law – through which a third party
including but not limited to a governmental
enforcement agency can demand payment from the
company, and that some third party, known or
unknown to the entity issuing the statement, will be
aware of that mechanism and use it to seek
payment.

Environmental Liabilities and Asset Retirement
Obligations
FASB Interpretation No. 47, like FIN 48, was
issued in response to companies’ adoption of
diverse accounting practices related to AROs. FIN
47 clarifies that companies must record the fair
value of conditional AROs as soon as incurred if
the fair value can be reasonably estimated. In some
cases, disclosure provided by the company is
supplemented with and even dictated by data that is
publicly available through the Superfund Program.
Superfund refers to the 1980 Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act that gave the Environmental
Protection Agency the authority to identify parties
responsible for the contamination of U.S. sites and
compel cleanup efforts.
An interesting facet of the accounting
guidelines related to AROs involves the
characterization of a liability as broader than a
contractual obligation to sacrifice a resource.
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
143 states that its guidelines apply to “legal
obligations … a legal obligation is an obligation
that a party is required to settle as a result of an
existing or enacted law, statute, ordinance, or
written or oral contract or by legal construction of a
contract under the doctrine of promissory estoppel”
(2). SFAS 143 applies promissory estoppel as
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary: “The principle
that a promise made without consideration may
nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the
promisor should have reasonably expected the
promisee to rely on the promise and if the promisee
did actually rely on the promise to his or her
detriment” (SFAS 143, A2c). The implementation
guidance notes correspondingly that “a legal
obligation may exist even though no party has
taken any formal action” and requires entities to
base their evaluation of whether an obligation
exists on current laws and not on forecasts of future
laws or changed interpretations of existing laws
(SFAS 143, A3). The FASB cites the example of a
CEO who makes public comments stating that his
company will clean up an abandoned building in
future years as potentially constituting a recordable
liability under promissory estoppel. In its basis for
conclusions, the FASB writes: “Once an entity
determines that a duty or responsibility exists, it
will then need to assess whether an obligating event
has occurred that leaves it little or no discretion to
avoid the transfer or use of assets” (SFAS 143,
B29).
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statements. One critic described the proposed
disclosures as “inherently capable of
misinterpretation, at best, and utterly meaningless,
at worst” (Potts-Dupre).
Though the issues and potential impacts of the
proposed multiemployer plan disclosure
amendment are different from those associated with
uncertain tax positions, the debate regarding when,
if ever, to report prospective liabilities that have a
remote chance of actually occurring. While it is
true that companies choosing to withdraw from an
underfunded pension plan must typically pay large
withdrawal liability assessments or “exit fees,” it is
unreasonable to ask companies to report those
amounts if the chance of ever having to pay those
amounts is remote. Many businesses are susceptible
to the impact of natural disasters and war, but a
quantification of those kinds of risks would be
misleading to a prospective investor if the
businesses were otherwise financially secure.

Participation in Multiemployer Plans
The FASB is expected to issue a final
document related to enhancing the disclosure
requirements about an employer’s participation in a
multiemployer plans in the second quarter of 2011
(FASB Current Technical Plan). Existing guidance
related to accounting for multiemployer plans is
represented in Codification Subtopic 715-80. The
FASB writes that it decided to update 715-80 after
it received “comments from various constituents on
the perceived lack of transparency about an
employer’s participation in a multiemployer plan”
(FASB Exposure Draft). The proposed amendments
would require employers to provide a narrative
description of “the employer’s exposure to
significant risks and uncertainties arising from its
participation in the plan(s). That narrative
description shall include the extent to which, under
the terms and conditions of the plan(s), the
employer can be liable to the plan(s) for other
participating employer’s obligations.” Employers
would also be required to identify “known trends in
contributions, including the extent to which a
surplus or deficit in the plan may affect future
contributions,” and other related pieces of
information.
Critics of the proposed amendment argue that
it will discourage employers from providing
defined benefit plans to employees and instead
offer defined contribution plans because the
amendment will force companies to disclose
liabilities that are unlikely to be realized. In
particular, the amendment would require companies
to disclose the effects of their potential withdrawal
from a multiemployer plan even if they have no
intention of withdrawing. “As stated in the FASB’s
Guiding Principles, to be neutral, ‘information must
report economic activity as faithfully as possible
without coloring the image it communicates for the
purpose of influencing behavior in any particular
direction,’” one critic writes (Kraw). “The FASB
proposals, if adopted, are by their very construct
biased against the continuation of multiemployer
defined benefit plans. They inevitably will produce
large amounts of inaccurate information that
exaggerate pension plan liabilities, encourage short
term thinking and push employers to exit.” Other
letters addressed the fact that information about
assets and accumulated benefit obligations of
defined benefit plans is difficult to collect and
contingent upon decisions made by labor unions
with little forewarning and thus would be dated and
allegedly useless if presented in financial

Convergence with International Standards
The U.S. and the FASB are in discussions with
the International Accounting Standards Board to
eventually converge the guidelines of GAAP with
those of International Financial Reporting
Standards so that there will exist a set of unified
global accounting policies. The SEC has indicated
that the largest U.S. corporations will not be
required to adopt IFRS until 2015 or 2016 at the
earliest, if at all (Tweedie), and a final decision on
whether or not to officially incorporate IFRS into
the U.S. domestic reporting system may come
during 2011.
If convergence does occur, it may yield an
entirely new set of standards related to accounting
for UTPs. Should ASC 740 be altered, Schedule
UTP would have to be reevaluated. It is currently
based on the MLTN test, a test that could be
superseded or altered by new income tax
accounting requirements. Schedule UTP is now
justified on the basis that companies do not incur
significant costs in preparing Schedule UTP
because they already analyze the sustainability of
tax positions in order to comply with GAAP. If the
requirement to analyze the sustainability of all tax
positions ceases, Schedule UTP compliance would
become more costly for companies.
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At a July 2005 meeting of the IASB, the Board
agreed that enterprises should presume that taxing
authorities will review a tax positions when
evaluating whether the position is probable of being
sustained and that consideration of detection risk is
inappropriate (IASB Agenda Project). An exposure
draft proposing to replace IAS 12 was issued in
March 2009. It included the following guidance:
“Uncertainty about whether the tax authorities will
accept the amounts reported to them by the entity
affects the amount of current tax and deferred tax.
An entity shall measure current and deferred tax
assets and liabilities using the probability-weighted
average amount of all the possible outcomes,
assuming that the tax authorities will examine the
amounts reported to them and have full knowledge
of all relevant information. Changes in the
probability-weighted average amount of all
possible outcomes shall be based on new
information, not a new interpretation by the entity
of previously available information” (Exposure
Draft 26).
In November 2009, the IASB found that
support from respondents was limited and decided
that the project would not proceed in its thencurrent form (IASB Agenda Project). On its
website, the IASB writes: “The project originally
started as a convergence project with US GAAP.
However, in the light of responses to an exposure
draft published in 2009, the Board has narrowed the
scope of the project. The Board may consider a
fundamental review of the accounting for income
taxes after 2011” (Work plan for IFRSs). Though
the Board intends to consider uncertain tax
positions separately from IAS 12 as a whole, it will
not visit the issue until the revision of IAS 37 is
finalized; that project will not be finished until after
June 2011 according to the work plan website.
Another point of distinction to be resolved
between GAAP and IFRS involves the reporting
threshold. While ASC 740 disallows companies
from recording any portion of a tax benefit that is
less than 50% likely to be sustained, IFRS tends to
utilize an expected-outcome method. Consider a tax
benefit of $100 that the company believes has a
20% chance of being completely sustained, a 40%
chance of being reduced to $60 and a 40% chance
of being completely disallowed. The FIN 48 test
would require that the company record a tax benefit
of $60, since the probability that the benefit will be
at least $60 is 60%: 40% plus 20%. An expectedoutcome calculation would yield a tax benefit of
$48: 0.20*100 + 0.40*60 + 0.40*0.

International Accounting Standard No. 12,
“Income Taxes,” currently advises that unresolved
disputes with tax authorities be handled in
accordance with IAS 37, “Provisions, Contingent
Liabilities and Contingent Assets” (IAS 12, 88).
IAS 37 advocates an expected outcome approach
that uses the probability-weighted average of a
variety of possible outcomes to calculate the
amount that should be recorded as a tax benefit or
liability. The standard requires separate treatment
of provisions, defined as “liabilit[ies] of uncertain
timing or amount” and contingent liabilities,
defined as “a possible obligation that arises from
past events and whose existence will be confirmed
only by the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or
more uncertain future events not wholly within the
control of the entity” or a present obligation not
recognized because resource outflow is improbable
or the amount of the obligation is uncertain (IAS
37, 10). UTPs would likely be treated as contingent
liabilities because the obligation to pay the tax is
dependent upon the actions of regulatory agencies
and courts.
IAS 37 does not require entities to recognize
contingent liabilities (27), but does require
disclosure “unless the possibility of an outflow of
resources embodying economic benefits is remote”
(28). Contingent liabilities must be continually
assessed and recognized as a provision in the
financial statements “if it becomes probable that an
outflow of future economic benefits will be
required for an item previously dealt with as a
contingent liability” (30). The standard instructs:
“Where the provision being measured involves a
large population of items, the obligation is
estimated by weighting all possible outcomes by
their associated probabilities … The provision will
therefore be different depending on whether the
probability of a loss of a given amount is, for
example, 60 per cent or 90 per cent. Where there is
a continuous range of possible outcomes, and each
point in that range is as likely as any other, the midpoint of the range is used” (39). Disclosure must
include a brief description of the nature of the
obligation and an indication of the uncertainties
about the amount or timing of outflows (85). The
standard does not explicitly state the extent to
which individual liabilities must be separately
identified, stating, “It is necessary to consider
whether the nature of the items is sufficiently
similar for a single statement about them to fulfill
the requirements” (87).
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If there was no chance that the $100 benefit
would be disallowed entirely but a 40% chance it
would be reduced to $50, the FIN 48 test would
still yield a $60 tax benefit but an expectedoutcome approach would yield a recordable benefit
of $62: 0.20*100 + 0.40*60 + 0.40*50. Though an
expected-outcome calculation incorporates a wider
range of possible outcomes, critics argue that it
requires companies to estimate the probability that
remote and highly certain positions will be
sustainable. The Tax Executives Institute
commented on the IAS 12 exposure draft: “The
absence of a recognition threshold (as proposed in
the Exposure Draft) would result in potential
inaccuracies by requiring companies to recognize
tax benefits that are highly uncertain or even those
for which no or only meager authority exists.
Likewise, reserves would have to be provided for
highly certain positions if there are possible
outcomes yielding less than 100 percent of the tax
benefits. The measurement of tax positions that are
at the highly certain or highly uncertain ends of the
probability spectrum should not be skewed by
outcomes that are remote” (TEI Comments).
IAS 12 is silent on UTPs in its existing form,
so the ultimate IFRS will likely have a significant
impact on the future of Schedule UTP if the U.S.
does adopt international reporting standards in the
future.

aware of those potential liabilities. The problematic
side effect of reporting such liabilities, though, is
the possibility that doing so may actually trigger
scrutiny of the positions that would not have taken
place absent the financial reporting. The statute of
limitations for tax reporting far exceeds the time
period companies are afforded to prepare financial
statements, and so regulators will always be able to
refer to a company’s financial statements in
inspecting that company’s tax return. Though FIN
48 was originally intended to clarify reporting
practices related to income taxes and has been
successful in creating more consistency than
existed previously, it has also created a tool through
which regulators can garner a peek into the
perspective of the taxpayer – an advantage not
reciprocated. The requirements of FIN 48 make it
far more difficult for tax-aggressive companies to
underreport tax liability, but at the cost of
potentially influencing, for better or worse, the
economic realities that GAAP purports to reflect.
While the disclosures required by FIN 48 are
theoretically flawed because detection risk is
ignored, an aggregated presentation of potential tax
liability is not egregiously harmful. Though some
distortion occurs in estimating tax position
sustainability without regard to audit probability,
the distortion is likely less significant than that
created by the misuse of reserves and reporting
policy discrepancies that were permissible under
SFAS 109.
Of greater concern from a policy standpoint is
the IRS’s new Schedule UTP. Though the schedule
will undoubtedly improve the U.S. government’s
ability to target its audits toward likely tax evaders
and thereby increase corporate collections, it holds
the capacity to alter the dynamics of the taxpayergovernment relationship significantly. Even if the
IRS upholds its policy of restraint and chooses not
to seek explicitly privileged documentations and
opinions, it will now have at its disposal a tool that
allows it to target those tax benefits that a
company’s managers, lawyers and accountants
believe are susceptible to successful challenge,
even if those parties all believe that the position has
standing supportable by law. While decisions
regarding tax law will ultimately be made in the
courts, the fact that the IRS will have undue insight
into the strength of taxpayer positions means it can
potentially strong-arm companies into reaching
settlements or sway a judge knowing that the
company’s management has exposed internal
doubts on the sustainability of a position.

Conclusions
The FASB defines a liability as a “probable
future sacrifice of economic benefits arising from a
present obligation.” The legal requirement to pay
taxes clearly creates a liability, and stakeholders of
a company need to be aware of that company’s
liabilities in order to make an informed decision
regarding whether or not to enter into a financial
relationship with the company. What FIN 48
attempts to address, though, are those situations in
which it is unclear whether or not the obligation to
pay taxes exists. U.S. tax law includes a large
number of provisions governing income and
expense classification as well as policy-driven
deductions, credits and penalties that require
tremendous compliance efforts. When tax laws do
not neatly correspond to the events and transactions
undertaken by a given corporation, the managers of
that business must interpret applicable laws and
decide whether or not to report taxable income.
If corporations report to the IRS and other
regulatory agencies tax benefits that are likely to be
challenged and reversed, investors should be made
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Of course, that the IRS merely has the ability
to take maximal advantage of Schedule UTP
disclosures does not mean that it will do so, just as
not all corporations will play the “audit lottery” or
take potentially risky tax positions simply because
they have the option to do so. Checks on each party
are important to maintaining the integrity of a
taxation system born out of democratic processes
and based on self-reported liabilities versus
government-imposed assessments. The IRS – an
agent of the public itself – needs to retain the ability
to effectively audit individual and corporate
taxpayers so that tax burdens are effected in the
manner that the legislative branch of government
has instructed. Similarly, taxpayers must be
afforded the ability to dispute IRS decisions and
have contentions resolved by a neutral third party,
the judicial branch. These checks allow the need of
both parties to pursue their respective interests to be
balanced by a public-demanded fairness.
If the IRS is going to ask corporate taxpayers
to disclose information intended for internal use,
the agency should provide a similar level of
disclosure regarding its interpretations of its own
policies and case assessment strategies. Taxpayers
should have plentiful opportunities to solicit
guidance from the IRS and seek preliminary
interpretations of policy without the possibility that
such inquiries will color subsequent, formal
assessments. In 2005, the IRS piloted the
Compliance Assurance Process, a program that
allowed some large business taxpayers to identify
and resolve complicated tax issues prior to filing
their tax return. The program allows the IRS to use
audit resources more efficiently, gives the taxpayer
more certainty and a reduced compliance burden
and provides financial statement users with more
precise and reliable tax information than is
available when a company’s tax return is
completely subject to challenge by regulatory
agencies. The CAP, though, is currently optional
and Schedule UTP is not. The IRS should continue
to make guidance publicly available so that
taxpayers, if they so choose, can satisfy themselves
as to a tax position’s sustainability before taking the
position and deciding whether or not to record it in
the financial statements.
The issues associated with accounting for
income taxes also need to be part of a larger,
ongoing conversation about revisions to the U.S.
tax code. Many cite the financial burden of
complying with the current system and high
marginal corporate tax rates as reasons to modify
the system so that top marginal rates are lower but

fewer deductions and credits are available. A
simpler tax code could reduce the incidence of
uncertain tax positions altogether, a trend that
would benefit the IRS, taxpayers and financial
statement preparers and users.
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